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TRANSLATING FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES  
INTO PUBLIC LAW 
Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota∗ 
It is encouraging to see scholars like D. Theodore Rave take an in-
terest in the project of understanding the fiduciary foundations of pub-
lic authority.1  What might be called “fiduciary political theory” can 
indeed provide us with insight into institutional design within liberal 
democracies, and Politicians as Fiduciaries is an important addition to 
the scholarly work in this burgeoning field.2  Rave breaks new ground 
by exploring fiduciary political theory’s potential applicability to the 
field of election law and crystallizes this application through concrete 
prescriptions directed toward the treatment of partisan gerrymander-
ing cases by our federal courts.  But while we are sympathetic to  
the basic fiduciary rendering of democratic representation at the heart  
of Rave’s project, we are less sanguine about his rendering of the pri-
vate fiduciary model into redistricting law.3  Something gets lost in  
translation.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Ethan J. Leib is Professor of Law at Fordham Law School; David L. Ponet is Parliamentary 
Specialist at the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); and Michael Serota holds a J.D 
from the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.  Authors’ names are listed in alpha-
betical order.  Thanks to Richard Squire, Evan Fox-Decent, Evan Criddle, Caroline Gentile,  
and Paul Miller for their comments and suggestions.  Fordham Law School provided financial  
support. 
 1 D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013).  
 2 See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE (2012); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Po-
net & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); 
Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative Engagement with 
Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178 (2012); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons 
for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249 (2011); see also Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary 
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 
(2010); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 
(2006); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259 
(2005); Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare 
Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 245 (2007); Robert 
G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004).  Much of this 
work was foreshadowed in Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUI-
TY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 131 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995); and Paul Finn, Public Trust and Public 
Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224 (1994). 
 3 Nothing in this essay should be taken as an argument against redistricting law reform ef-
forts, or even against the potential applicability of fiduciary political theory to support such ef-
forts.  We only offer an analysis of Rave’s attempt at translating fiduciary principles into a partic-
ular redistricting law reform agenda.  We do not, alas, have the room to develop an affirmative 
argument setting forth the best way to undertake a translation of fiduciary political theory into 
redistricting law.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224330
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The central claim of Politicians as Fiduciaries is that courts should 
treat “political representatives . . . as fiduciaries, subject to a duty of 
loyalty, which they breach when they manipulate election laws to their 
own advantage.”4  From this idea flows Rave’s proposal that, “[j]ust as 
the remedy for breach of the duty of loyalty in agency or corporate law 
is invalidation of the conflicted transaction, the remedy for a law 
passed in breach of representatives’ duty of loyalty should be [judicial] 
invalidation of” redistricting plans voted upon by “conflicted” legisla-
tors.5  Together, these propositions evidence Rave’s views that the 
analogy between private and public fiduciaries is not only tight but al-
so that identical duties and immunities should accrue to corporate and 
political fiduciaries.6  He argues not only that the standard of loyalty is 
the same among private and public fiduciaries but also that the duties 
should be enforced in the same way by the same institutional actors: 
judges. 
In general terms, there is much to like in Rave’s commitment to the 
politicians-as-fiduciaries framework.  Because public office is a public 
trust, fiduciary architecture can help orient us in figuring out how po-
litical power should be exercised legitimately.  As we have previously 
argued, “seeing political representation as a form of fiduciary represen-
tation heightens sensitivity to policing the exercise of discretion, the 
trust reposed in the representative, and the vulnerabilities created by 
the relationship.”7  Part of the appeal of conceiving the political rela-
tionship between representative and represented in fiduciary terms is 
that it regards politics in more realistic and textured ways — as a con-
stellation of power relationships in a web of trust and vulnerability — 
rather than as a mere social contract no one ever signed.  Thinking of 
legislators as public fiduciaries tells us much about the nature of the 
relationship between the governed and their governors and it can also 
provide some normative benchmarks for evaluating the political mo-
rality of elected representatives and for designing the institutions that 
channel and control their conduct.   
And yet, although Politicians as Fiduciaries rightly taps fiduciary 
theory for a fresh look at the problem of partisan gerrymandering, we 
believe that important aspects of Rave’s execution miss their mark.  
Rave’s straightforward application of private law fiduciary duties to 
acts of political representation — in addition to his proposal for judi-
cial enforcement of such duties — overlooks the relational dimensions 
of the fiduciary principle.  Fiduciary law is not unitary in how it iden-
tifies relationships and imposes duties — a fact not made clear by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Rave, supra note 1, at 677. 
 5 Id. at 719–720. 
 6 See id. at 723–724.   
 7 Leib & Ponet, supra note 2, at 186. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224330
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Rave’s too-direct transplantation of private law concepts into the redi-
stricting domain.  The private law controlling fiduciaries struggles 
mightily to calibrate the way it enforces the duties it imposes to the 
three indicia constitutive of the fiduciary relationship: the fiduciary’s 
discretionary power over the beneficiary’s assets or interests, the trust 
reposed in the fiduciary, and the beneficiary’s vulnerability.  Private 
law establishes first that the indicia are met and then develops rela-
tionship-specific duty applications that make sense within the relevant 
relational environments.  Rave’s analysis would benefit from engaging 
hard questions about who is really best identified as the public fidu-
ciary, who is the actual beneficiary, and what are the right ways to en-
force the constraints of the sui generis fiduciary relationships in the po-
litical sphere. 
In what follows, we develop two points: Part I elaborates upon 
why Rave’s neat application of private fiduciary law to public fiducia-
ries should be messier than it is; and Part II interrogates whether his 
preferred judicial remedies are appropriately calibrated to generate the 
trust necessary for public fiduciary relationships to function well. 
I.  PUBLIC FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 
The private law does not apply fiduciary duties without first mak-
ing an effort to determine whether the relationship at issue is truly a 
fiduciary one.  Although some categories of relationships are presump-
tively fiduciary — agent-principal, attorney-client, guardian-ward — 
whenever a breach of fiduciary duty claim is made, judges first seek to 
establish the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.  And, once a particular relationship has been identified as a 
fiduciary one, judges do not apply a one-size-fits-all approach: the way 
in which fiduciary obligations are enforced tends to be calibrated in a 
manner sensitive to the type of relationship at issue.  To wit: although 
an agent, a trustee, a corporate director, a parent, and a lawyer can all 
be fiduciaries owing a duty of loyalty to their beneficiaries, that duty is 
enforced differentially, with varying degrees of strictness, according to 
the characteristics of the particular relationship at issue.  This variance 
makes sense because, although these fiduciaries all exercise discretio-
nary power over a beneficiary’s assets or interests, the power struc-
tures that inhere in business, familial, and legal relations are qualita-
tively different.8 
Politicians as Fiduciaries overlooks the diversity of the relational 
landscape to which the fiduciary principle applies.  Although Rave is 
principally drawn to the corporate law version of the fiduciary, in 
which the director is the fiduciary, he speaks loosely about the legisla-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 See generally Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009). 
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tor as also an agent and a trustee, as if all three are interchangeable 
because they are all fiduciaries.9  Throughout most of Politicians as 
Fiduciaries, however, Rave simply analogizes the legislator to a corpo-
rate director and proceeds to a straightforward application of the duty 
of loyalty as interpreted in the corporate context.  But political rela-
tionships and corporate relationships are sufficiently different that one 
should be wary of seamless application from one context to the other. 
To apply the duty of loyalty to an elected legislator, one needs a 
clearer identification of just what sort of fiduciary a political repre-
sentative is.  As we have discussed in previous work, public fiduciaries 
are sui generis: 
[I]n pitching public officeholders as fiduciaries, one must take stock of 
possible differences between private and public fiduciaries.  Translation is 
one thing — but analogizing dissimilar categories can lead to category 
mistakes. . . . Not all translations will be smooth, . . . and one must remain 
mindful that while public fiduciaries are morphologically similar, they are 
not identical to their private law counterparts and ancestors.10 
Accordingly, to establish that public officials are in a meaningful 
sense public fiduciaries and what sort of duties should be applied to 
them (and by whom), it is essential to explore the relationships within 
the political landscape to better map who is the fiduciary for whom 
and to what degree. 
Politicians as Fiduciaries contains some such analysis,11 but Rave 
explores the relational complexity only lightly and presumes rather 
than clarifies the nature of the power relationship that triggers fidu-
ciary obligation.  Yet this relational ambiguity is a core difficulty asso-
ciated with applying fiduciary political theory to redistricting law.  The 
following example highlights the practical import of this point. 
Consider the cross-cutting relational obligations confronting a New 
York state legislator for District 77, Assemblywoman X.  Assembly-
woman X is one of 150 legislators in the New York State Assembly.  
When she takes her seat in the legislature, her oath of office directs her 
to uphold the constitution of New York and the Constitution of the 
United States,12 both of which empower her, among other things, to 
draw district lines within her state through redistricting plans.  For 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See Rave, supra note 1, at 718–719.  In previous work, we have explored how the category 
of the fiduciary supervenes over both agency and trustee conceptualizations of political represen-
tation.  See Leib & Ponet, supra note 2, at 179.  Even if both are fiduciaries, the duties are not 
likely applied in identical fashion as between agent and trustee — and they are not likely to be 
applied identically between private and public versions thereof.   
 10 Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14).    
 11 See Rave, supra note 1, at 711–713. 
 12 New York State Senate or New York State Assembly Member, Officer or Employee 
Oath/Affirmation, DOS-1692-f-l (2011), available at http://www.dos.ny.gov/forms/corporations 
/1692-f-l.pdf. 
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whom does Assemblywoman X serve as a fiduciary?  Does Assembly-
woman X stand in a fiduciary relationship to District 77’s constitu-
ents?  To the entire state’s citizenry?  To the people of the United 
States?  These questions matter for Rave’s core case, which treats As-
semblywoman X’s participation in drawing District 77’s lines — some-
thing she is constitutionally authorized to do by two different sove-
reign charters — as a breach of a fiduciary obligation, rendering her 
district lines susceptible to judicial invalidation. 
A proper relational analysis reveals that Assemblywoman X is like-
ly a fiduciary for both her district’s constituents and the people of New 
York.  To begin with, Assemblywoman X surely has some power over 
the whole state — and a fortiori her district — because she helps con-
trol the legal and practical interests of the entire state: she makes 
statewide criminal law and passes the statewide budget.  Assembly-
woman X must also be trusted by both her constituents and the state’s 
citizenry; she is fairly difficult to monitor (especially by those with ab-
solutely no say in her election), and she keeps the state vulnerable to 
her possible exploitation or to pursuit of her own private interests at 
odds with the public welfare.   
Along the same lines, Assemblywoman X may also be a fiduciary 
for the nation’s citizenry, at least in those instances in which the entire 
country is subject to her authority.  For example, if she were redistrict-
ing a “swing state” instead of New York — or voting on a statewide 
voter identification law that could affect the outcome of the presiden-
tial race — her duties might flow outward in light of her work’s na-
tional repercussions.  The paradox of much elective political represen-
tation, then, is precisely that the representative is selected locally and 
“represents” her home district in some senses but that she also serves 
the people and wields power more broadly.  Others’ interests, vulnera-
ble to her legal power over them, may thus need to be protected both 
by and against her activities.  And the oath of office, which is in no 
way directed to ensure loyalty to local constituents, casts the unique 
nature of the public fiduciary relationship into sharp relief by suggest-
ing a fiduciary obligation that begins with the district but extends out 
to the whole state and even the whole nation. 
This analysis has important implications for the viability of Rave’s 
project first and foremost because it complicates his story about the re-
levant principal.  Rave tends to assume it is the voters in District 77.  
Yet the work of the state legislator really must serve many plausible 
candidates for principal — and conflicts must be measured relational-
ly.  Even if the people of the nation are an occasional (if somewhat at-
tenuated) candidate for the beneficiary role, there are strong arguments 
to be made that both the members of the district and the citizens of the 
whole state are the relevant beneficiaries.  Canonical political philoso-
phy confirms this point, while further suggesting that the political rep-
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resentative, in cases of conflict, must be loyal to the state’s citizens as a 
whole rather than to her constituents.13   
And yet, if a state representative’s ultimate duty is to be loyal to 
the state, it is hard to complain that Assemblywoman X is self-dealing 
when she pursues a redistricting plan that she believes to be in the 
state’s best interest.  Assemblywoman X’s duty to pursue the good of 
her statewide constituency likely supervenes over the immediate con-
flict created by her direct interest in a redistricting plan.14  
The difficulty of identifying the relevant principal is not the only 
challenge facing the fiduciary framework at the heart of Politicians as 
Fiduciaries.  Rave’s model also poses a basic problem on its own 
terms within the corporate law context, even if one concedes some con-
flict with some relevant beneficiary.  To wit, Assemblywoman X rece-
ives special authorization from two different sovereign charters: the 
Constitution of the State of New York and the U.S. Constitution.  Un-
like a general authorization to act on behalf of a principal, which 
would be limited by the common law’s fiduciary obligations, legislators 
engaged in redistricting act in accordance with a (doubly) specific 
permission and with an exclusion from the charge of self-dealing.  It is 
as if a corporate charter told a director that she may vote on compen-
sation packages for directors as a whole; that permission establishes 
the scope of the fiduciary relationship and sanctions the specific form 
of self-dealing at issue there.15  This type of authorization, which es-
sentially imposes a structural requirement of self-dealing, is clearly 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 The dual nature of political representation has been observed by several political philoso-
phers who acknowledge, each in their own way, that the representative may be at once partial to 
one societal segment while also responsible for representing the broader public good.  See, e.g., 
EDMUND BURKE, Speech to the Electors at Bristol, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 
186, 186–87 (Peter J. Stanlis ed., 1963); see generally, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERA-
TIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (London, Parker, Son & Bourn 1861).  
 14 Note importantly (as Rave does, but without sufficient concern) that much partisan gerry-
mandering concerns congressional redistricting by state legislators, a domain in which concern 
about direct self-dealing fades.  Whatever indirect benefit Assemblywoman X might get from a 
congressional redistricting plan, voting on such plans simply cannot constitute self-dealing and a 
clear conflict of interest.  Without the stench of self-dealing and conflict, Rave cannot make out 
the simple case of fiduciary breach that he attempts to establish in a large class of cases that come 
before the courts. 
 15 Another example of an act that could give rise to a claim based upon breach of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty unless explicitly permitted in the charter is usurpation of corporate opportunities.  
Under the common law, directors were prohibited by the fiduciary duty of loyalty from taking 
business opportunities that belonged to the corporation.  See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 
511 (Del. 1939).  But as of 2000, section 122(17) of the Delaware General Corporation Law per-
mits a corporation to “[r]enounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of di-
rectors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to par-
ticipate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories of business 
opportunities that are presented to the corporation or 1 or more of its officers, directors or stock-
holders.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2000). 
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permissible.16  Similarly, the U.S. and state constitutions tell legislators 
that they may self-deal in this limited way. 
Moreover, in corporate law, statutes specifically permit conflicted 
transactions to stand, so long as they are adequately disclosed and ap-
proved by a majority of disinterested directors.17  A shareholder, ac-
cordingly, does not have a winning suit for breach of the duty of loyal-
ty if the nonconflicted directors vote to approve the transaction.  
Applied to the context of redistricting, this principle suggests that, so 
long as the rest of the legislature goes along with drawing District 77 
as District 77’s representative prefers, the “taint” is essentially removed 
and the plan is neither void nor voidable for a breach of fiduciary du-
ty.  This result holds true because the “conflicted” legislator’s act is 
deemed cleansed through the legislature’s vote: so long as that legisla-
tor is not the deciding vote, the legislator did not taint the delibera-
tions, and the conflict was disclosed to all.  And, even if the represent-
ative from District 77 is considered conflicted with respect to District 
77’s line-drawing (a proposition complicated by the two charters that 
define the scope of the fiduciary relationship), the other 149 members 
of the New York Assembly are not directly conflicted with respect to 
District 77 in the same way.  Thus, a majority of their votes in support 
of the redistricting plan would effectively immunize our hypothetical 
Assemblywoman X from any breach of loyalty claim; no other safe 
harbors are required.18 
This point is only reinforced by the fact that “[m]ost states require 
the Governor to approve the redistricting plans” and “give the Gover-
nor the power to veto any redistricting plan introduced by the Legisla-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).  Indeed, it seems to be the statutory 
default rule that directors can vote on their own salaries even if the charter does not specifically 
authorize it.  See Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 203 (N.Y. 1996) (“Many jurisdictions, including 
New York, have since changed the common-law rule by statute providing that a corporation’s 
board of directors has the authority to fix director compensation unless the corporation’s charter 
or bylaws provides otherwise.  Thus, the allegation that directors have voted themselves compen-
sation is clearly no longer an allegation which gives rise to a cause of action, as the directors are 
statutorily entitled to set those levels.”).  See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a) (West 1977); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713(e) (McKinney 1998).  That kind of self-
dealing — which is permitted by corporate law — does not seem too different from legislators 
voting on redistricting plans once every ten years, or so one could argue. 
 17 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1); N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 713(a)(1). 
 18 Of course, some adjacent districts are affected by the hypothetical District 77’s contours — 
and the two-party system renders the redistricting plan a much more complex transaction with a 
cluster of potential indirect conflicts.  But corporate law’s approach to conflicts is to be particular 
about what qualifies as a true conflict.  Courts sniff for something that smells rotten — and they 
are quite hands-off when it comes to subtle inter-director ties, focused as they are on finding clear 
conflicts.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2011).  Even then, the safe harbor and the clear 
authorization seem to give legislators the same immunity from breach claims that their corporate 
sisters would get.   
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ture for any reason.”19  Such procedures involve yet another so-called 
“independent” director, the state’s chief executive officer;  which may 
further cleanse the potential taint of self-interest.  Alternatively, the 
governor’s role in overseeing redistricting plans in many states might 
also be viewed as being the direct voice of her state’s “shareholders,” 
given that the governor is directly elected from the entire state by 
popular vote and without being tethered to the districting process.20  
From this perspective, the governor’s approval of a particular redi-
stricting plan is like the second, shareholder-approval prong of corpo-
rate safe-harbor statutes.  Either way, the requirement of gubernatorial 
approval in the context of redistricting can provide another layer of 
cleansing. 
Yet there is little need to import the concept of corporate cleansing 
into the legislative arena to cast doubt on Rave’s  translation: there is a 
corollary public-law concept that has been a part of liberal political 
theory for more than two centuries.  As James Madison famously 
phrased his argument in support of a representative democracy in The 
Federalist No. 10, legislative bodies have the unique ability to “pass” 
private interests “through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.”21  
In other words, by submitting legislative proposals to the crucible of 
deliberation and the lawmaking process, there is supposed to be a kind 
of “filtering” effect that removes different forms of private-interest 
taint.  So, just as Rave avoids identifying the relevant beneficiary ade-
quately, he might also be misidentifying the relevant fiduciary as 
well — that is, the right level of analysis might be to consider the legis-
lature and not the individual legislator.22  Although that institutional 
picture has much going for it (the consequences of which we cannot 
spell out in this context), it would deeply disrupt the mechanics of 
Rave’s analysis. 
Beyond what we have just said about the way some corporate law 
could be used to undermine Rave’s ultimate result, our core thesis is 
that there is an important mismatch between corporations and legisla-
tures.  As Rave certainly appreciates, unlike some directors in a corpo-
ration, there are exceedingly few meaningfully independent legisla-
tors.23  Almost all legislators are members of national political parties 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 State-by-state Redistricting Procedures, BALLOTOPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index 
.php/State-by-state_redistricting_procedures (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).  
 20 Thanks to Caroline Gentile for this insight. 
 21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Madison 
did not seek to remove the causes of faction (certainly not with as clunky a tool as judicial review) 
but rather to control its potentially pernicious effects through institutional design. 
 22 Professor Evan Fox-Decent, a fiduciary political theorist with an extraordinary book on this 
subject, tends to see state authority as the right analytical level at which to apply fiduciary norms.  
See generally FOX-DECENT, supra note 2.  
 23 See Rave, supra note 1, at 680, 685, 724 n.303.   
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that exert some influence and apply pressure in the redistricting con-
text.24  Thus, the real culprits driving the transactions Rave identifies 
as self-dealing may be the political parties—a point which would ap-
pear to militate against a finding of breach of fiduciary obligation in 
the average redistricting transaction for the average politician.  
To be sure, “fiduciary political theory” might be able to find a way 
to explore how interconnections between districts and parties actually 
can be thought to run afoul of the safe harbor conferred by the legisla-
tive process.  But Rave has not provided a sustained argument tracing 
these complexities and relationships.  At the very least, the fact that 
political parties may be intervening causes interrupts an easy applica-
tion of private fiduciary principles to legislators, unless the parties are 
also fiduciaries and owe something to beneficiaries — an unlikely con-
clusion, and not one for which Rave argues.  Yet, political parties are 
an essential piece of the puzzle, and simply mapping the private fidu-
ciary role onto state legislators as individuals tells us little about how 
to constrain party behavior, undoubtedly the root cause of partisan 
gerrymandering.  Shoehorning fiduciary principles to force them to fit 
this relational matrix is, we hope we have shown here, an unwieldy  
affair. 
II.  JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT 
The overlooked complexities of fiduciary political theory in Politi-
cians as Fiduciaries also spill over into the question about whether 
judicial enforcement is really the best design choice for fiduciary over-
sight.  Rave’s argument in support of judicial resolution of political 
gerrymandering claims is simple enough: “Just as the remedy for 
breach of the duty of loyalty in agency or corporate law is invalidation 
of the conflicted transaction, the remedy for a law passed in breach of 
representatives’ duty of loyalty should be invalidation of the” redi-
stricting plan.25  Rave contends that “[w]hen legislatures pass laws re-
gulating the political process that might serve to entrench incumbents 
(such as drawing districts), a conflict of interest exists,” which “should 
trigger heightened judicial scrutiny, just like a conflict of interest 
would in the corporate context.”26 
To Rave’s credit, when he pivots toward identifying the right judi-
cial remedy, Rave does not argue for a free-standing cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty upon a legislator’s “conflicted” vote for a redi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Of course, the real question is whether the ties supplied by political parties eviscerate the 
entire legislature’s ability to claim that it is authorized and permitted a safe harbor to redistrict.  
That is a hard question whose answer cannot be assumed in order to avoid difficult explanations 
about the mechanics of establishing a valid breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. 
 25 Rave, supra note 1, at 720.   
 26 Rave, supra note 1, at 723.    
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stricting plan.  Putting aside our skepticism that one could make out a 
valid and traditional breach of fiduciary duty claim in the relevant re-
lational matrix, Rave is clearly right that a simplistic cause of action 
against legislators is counterindicated.27  Nevertheless, Rave’s conclu-
sion that judges are “institutionally well suited” to evaluate the 
processes by which redistricting plans are devised seems unlikely to 
us.28  Indeed, Politicians as Fiduciaries proposes an enforcement me-
chanism deeply at odds with prevailing districting practices, and one 
insensitive to the moral and institutional ecosystem of the public fidu-
ciary relationship. 
On Rave’s view, the vast majority of states would not qualify for 
safe harbors (by his own account most legislatures show no sign of 
ceding districting control), which means most judges would still be in 
the business of entire fairness review, the very kind of review he thinks 
judges ill suited to make.29  Moreover, even if there were significant 
migration to process review as legislatures responded to the legal in-
centives to avoid careful judicial scrutiny, there are few helpful guide-
posts for ascertaining the proper kind of process that judges should 
treat as providing safe harbor.  There is, of course, a danger that 
judges themselves may be conflicted and partisan, so vagaries in 
benchmarks for process review invite all the same concerns with which 
Rave begins. 
Rave also ignores, most importantly, that the threat of judicial en-
forcement is only one blunt mechanism used to deter breaches of fidu-
ciary duties, and it is one that is often inadvisable, especially in the 
public realm.  Fiduciary law — the law of trust, not just the law of 
trusts — sometimes looks to create room for relationships to breathe to 
help avoid “crowding out” interpersonal trust by enforcing very de-
manding standards of behavior.30  Designing an optimal regime for fi-
duciary oversight involves creating multifarious signals and orienta-
tions for fiduciaries to help them in their relationships with 
beneficiaries.  But the law should shy away from judicial microma-
nagement because public-law relationships — like their private law co-
rollaries — are not generally the sort of relationships that take well to 
too much judicial meddling.31  This essential part of the fiduciary 
principle disappears in Rave’s application. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 But see Complaint at 1–2, Klein v. Reid, No. 6:12-CV-1256-ORL-36DAB, 2012 WL 4856743 
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012) (misunderstanding Ponet & Leib, supra note 2, to establish a cause of 
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 28 Rave, supra note 1, at 724. 
 29 Id. at 725–26. 
 30 See Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 905–06 (2011). 
 31 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foun-
dations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1797–98 (2001). 
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Within the fiduciary field, courts are long on rhetoric precisely be-
cause they rarely wield the stick — and extralegal sanctions do much 
of the work to police compliance.32  In the political sphere, we have 
many extralegal mechanisms to reinforce fiduciary obligations: elec-
tions, civil society, newspapers, and watchdog groups are as much a 
part of the tapestry of fiduciary governance as courts are.  Without 
strong reinforcement of social norms and institutional design to help 
nurture such norms (which judicial review could crowd out), these par-
ticular fiduciary relationships could be threatened.  All of this is to say 
that “independent” institutions for redistricting might be salutary and 
supported by some general fiduciary political theory, but fiduciary 
principles do not easily support specific doctrinal mechanisms of judi-
cial enforcement.  Indeed, some measure of judicial abdication may 
trigger more mobilization for real reform through plebiscites and other 
innovations than would a faint-hearted process review that does little 
to cleanse self-dealing behavior.33  Ultimately, close judicial scrutiny of 
redistricting may do much to pollute the legitimacy of the judicial 
branch, which cannot help but seem transparently political when de-
ciding partisan gerrymandering cases. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Rave should be commended for taking a growing oeuvre of fidu-
ciary political theory and producing a practical doctrinal payoff for 
public law.  Yet Politicians as Fiduciaries also serves as an important 
reminder that one must take great care to consider the limitations of 
analogy and metaphor in the course of proposing private law solutions 
for public governance problems.  A straightforward importation of 
private law duties into the unique relationship between represented 
and representative is not appropriate.  Instead, we need a deeper ap-
preciation of the particularities of political relationships so that we can 
calibrate the fiduciary principle and related enforcement mechanisms 
to this sui generis public domain.  We hope others will take up this 
project after digesting Rave’s impressive and provocative piece of 
work. 
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 32 Id. at 1796–97. 
 33 See also Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
415, 430 (2011) (noting that episodic instrumentalist judicial decision making “may have the unin-
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